Trimming the Budget and Downsizing the Nuclear Weapons Complex

Recently enacted legislation is forcing a much-needed examination of national defense spending. The Budget Control Act of 2011, passed into law this summer, caps “security” discretionary spending for FY12 at $684 billion, a $4.5 billion decrease from FY11, and at $686 billion in FY13. The “security” category includes the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Veteran Affairs, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and the intelligence community management account. If the 12 member bipartisan Congressional Super Committee fails to enact a deficit reduction plan of “an amount greater than” $1.2 trillion by January 15, 2012, discretionary limits will be revised (redefined) as the traditional “050” budget category[1](Sec. 251A), meaning the DoD and some defense-related funding within the DOE, DHS, and FBI. The category does not include foreign aid, homeland security, veterans’ affairs and other categories of spending. In this case, the discretionary national security spending cap in FY13 would be $546 billion, $140 billion below the cap in the first case. Ultimately, where these reductions come from will be left up to Congress.

 As analysts have recently suggested, the BCA requirements present a perfect opportunity to reduce the bloated US nuclear weapon design, engineering and production complex, which is managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration,  a quasi-autonomous unit of the Deaprtment of Enegy (Congress wisely decided in 1946 to place both the military and civil aspects of atomic energy under civilian control, which explains the presence of a massive nuclear weapons enterprise within a civilian agency nominally devoted to peaceful energy development.)   Despite mounting budget deficits, NNSA continues to receive funding increases. Last month the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development (E&W) approved $11.050 billion for the NNSA in FY12, which includes $7.190 billion for nuclear weapons activities, $2.404 billion for nonproliferation, and $1.1 billion for naval reactors. E&W gave the NNSA less than what the agency requested ($440 million less for weapons activities and about $730 million less overall), but it still provides +$294 million for weapons activities and +$528 million overall compared to last year (By contrast, non-security appropriations from E&W in FY12 declined by $584 million compared to FY11). In the long term, the NNSA indicates in its Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) that it plans to spend $88 billion on nuclear weapons and the complex that supports it from FY12 to FY21, or $8.8 billion per year. It’s not clear yet whether the agency will scale back these plans in light of budget constraints. In addition, the Pentagon plans to invest $100 billion from FY11-FY20 into sustaining and improving strategic delivery systems (SDVs). When additional weapons-related costs are factored in, such as missile defense, environmental cleanup, and intelligence, we’re projected to spend $769 billion on nuclear weapons and related programs over the next 10 years, according to the Ploughshares Foundation.  

As numerous defense officials have pointed out in recent months, including the head of Strategic Command as well as the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, this situation is unsustainable from a budgetary standpoint. We simply can’t afford to keep spending on stockpile and complex maintenance and modernization at the current level. Such a situation compels us to conduct a rigorous cost/benefit analysis. We need to ask ourselves: is it worth it to maintain a nuclear deterrent based on the triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, an excessive model of nuclear deterrence left over from the Cold War, when a much less expensive “dyad”would likely deter just as effectively? Is it worth it to construct two brand new multibillion fissile material component facilities (the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Complex and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility at LANL) when our existing warhead plutonium pits won’t require replacement for another 50 years or more? Is it worth it to maintain a hedge force of 2,300 reserve warheads when our deployed arsenal is capable of meeting any existing or emerging threats? Are the security benefits of these multibillion dollar industries worth the costs?

Luckily it seems that at least one member of Congress is looking at these questions and coming up with constructive solutions. On September 23 Congressman Ed Markey (D-MA) wrote a letter to the Super Committee calling for a $20 billion annual cut in nuclear weapons spending over the next ten years, or $200 billion. He’s calling on his Congressional colleagues to add their signatures, and and as of this writing 34 have done so. Markey argues that our current spending and complex is a hangover from the Cold War, and that continuing to waste money on nuclear weapons at current levels amounts to “robbing the future to pay for the unneeded weapons of the past.” He accurately points out that the $20 billion we would save annually by itself could fund vital investments into our future, such as Pell Grants to help students pay for college. This budget debate will involve many difficult decisions and painful compromises on important programs that people rely on. When legislators are able to find obvious examples of wasteful government spending such as that seen in the nuclear weapons complex, spending which has long since outlived its purpose, the necessary course of action is clear. The Super Committee should seriously consider Congressman Markey’s innovative proposal.

Judging by its assessment in last year’s Nuclear Posture Review, the Obama Administration seems to agree conceptually with Congressman Markey: “The massive nuclear arsenal we inherited from the Cold War era of bipolar military confrontation is poorly suited to address the challenges posed by suicidal terrorists and unfriendly regimes seeking nuclear weapons. Therefore, it is essential that we better align our nuclear policies and posture to our most urgent priorities – preventing nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation.” The Administration’s assessment underscores the fact that these industries do not meet our most pressing national security challenges and are not worth the price. As our defense budget is brought in line with fiscal reality, we will need to shift investments away from costly and extravagant weapons projects and towards investments in clean energy, poverty reduction, and global public health. One of the first places we should look for budget cuts is the nuclear weapons stockpile and the complex that sustains it. The 2010 NPR, for all its flaws, still pointed toward a reduction of nukes in national defense. And in negotiating New START the Administration demonstrated its commitment to reducing the number of deployed warheads. Unfortunately, it has not demonstrated the same commitment to downsizing the supporting complex, and has committed billions to costly long-term modernization efforts that severely undermine the credibility of  the President’s professed vision of a world without nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the BCA makes such downsizing an imperative. The Super Committee should follow through on Congressman Markey’s recommendations, and look at the bloated nuclear weapons complex for savings before slashing the budgets of more important programs. 

Be sure to contact your Representative today and ask them to sign-on to Markey’s letter. Visit this site for more information.

[1] Function 050: National Defense includes the military activities of the Department of Defense (DoD), the nuclear-weapons related activities of the Department of Energy (DoE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration, the national security activities of several other agencies such as the Selective Service Agency, and portions of the activities of the Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The programs in this function include: the pay and benefits of active, Guard, and reserve military personnel; DoD operations including training, maintenance of equipment, and facilities; health care for military personnel and dependents; procurement of weapons; research and development; construction of military facilities, including housing; research on nuclear weapons; and the cleanup of nuclear weapons production facilities.

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